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A famous dictum in open economy macroeconomics -- which obtains in the Mundell-Fleming world
of sticky prices and perfect capital mobility -- holds that the choice of the optimal exchange rate regime
should depend on the type of shock hitting the economy. If shocks are predominantly real, a flexible
exchange rate is optimal, whereas if shocks are mainly monetary, a fixed exchange rate is optimal.
 There is no obvious reason, however, why this paradigm should be the most appropriate one to think
about this important issue.  Arguably, asset market frictions may be as pervasive as goods market frictions
(particularly in developing countries).  In this light, we show that in a model with flexible prices and
asset market frictions, the Mundell-Fleming dictum is turned on its head: flexible rates are optimal
in the presence of monetary shocks, whereas fixed rates are optimal in response to real shocks.  We
thus conclude that the choice of an optimal exchange rate regime should depend not only on the type
of shock (real versus monetary) but also on the type of friction (goods versus asset market).
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One of the most in￿ uential results in open economy macroeconomics ￿which
derives from the Mundell-Fleming model ￿holds that the choice of the ex-
change rate regime should depend on the type of shock hitting the economy.
If shocks are predominantly of real origin, then ￿ exible exchange rates are
optimal. Instead, if shocks are mainly monetary, ￿xed (or, more generally,
predetermined) exchange rates are optimal. In fact, as Calvo (1999, p. 4)
aptly puts it, this is ￿a result that every well-trained economist carries on
[his/her] tongue￿ . Calvo (1999) himself o⁄ers a simple derivation of this re-
sult in a model in which the policymaker￿ s objective is to minimize output
variability. The intuition is simple enough: in the Mundell-Fleming world of
sticky prices and perfect capital mobility, real shocks require an adjustment
in relative prices which, in the presence of sticky prices, can most easily be ef-
fected through changes in the nominal exchange rate. In contrast, monetary
shocks require an adjustment in real money balances that can be most eas-
ily carried out through changes in nominal money balances (which happens
endogenously under ￿xed exchange rates). By and large, this key result has
remained unscathed in modern variations of the Mundell-Fleming model. For
instance, Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) incorporate liability dollariza-
tion and balance sheets e⁄ects and conclude that the standard prescription
in favor of ￿ exible exchange rates in response to real shocks is not essentially
a⁄ected.
But rather than tweaking at the margin with variations of the traditional
Mundell-Fleming model, it could be argued that one should take issue with its
most critical assumption: imperfection in goods markets (i.e., sticky prices)
but undistorted capital markets (i.e., perfect capital mobility). Is this the
world we necessarily live in? Far from it. In developing countries, in particu-
lar, asset market frictions appear to be equally, if not more important, than
goods market frictions. In fact, a large segment of the population does not
seem to have access to asset markets.1 In this light, it seems worth revisiting
the Mundell-Fleming question in a model with ￿ exible prices but segmented
￿This paper was originally prepared for a conference in honor of Guillermo Calvo, held
at the International Monetary Fund in April 2004. We are grateful to Martin Eichenbaum
and conference participants for helpful comments and suggestions.
1Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) report that even for the United States, 59 percent
of the population (as of 1989) did not hold interest bearing assets. One would conjecture
that this ￿gure is even higher for developing countries.
2asset markets. This type of model posits that while a fraction of the pop-
ulation (referred to as traders) has access to asset markets, the rest of the
population (non-traders) does not. In a ￿rst paper (Lahiri, Singh, and VØgh
(2006a)), we examine this issue in the context of a stochastic model in which
traders have access to incomplete markets. In contrast, this paper develops
a much starker, perfect-foresight version of the model which, by avoiding a
myriad of technical complications, allows the essential mechanisms and in-
tuition to shine through. The paper￿ s punchline is that ￿contrary to the
Mundell-Fleming prescription mentioned above ￿if shocks are real, ￿xed ex-
change rates are optimal whereas if shocks are monetary, ￿ exible exchange
rates are optimal.
Intuitively, ￿ exible exchange rates allow for a costless adjustment to mon-
etary shocks by altering the real value of existing nominal money balances. In
contrast, under ￿xed rates, asset-market segmentation prevents non-traders
from rebalancing real money balances by accessing asset markets, which af-
fects the consumption path. Under real shocks, ￿xed rates allow purchasing
power to be transferred across periods, which results in some consumption
smoothing. Under ￿ exible rates, on the other hand, non-traders are forced
to consume their current endowment.
We thus conclude that the optimal exchange rate regime should depend
not only on the type of shock (real versus monetary) ￿as rightly empha-
sized by Mundell-Fleming models ￿but also on the type of distortion (goods
markets versus asset markets frictions).2 These ideas can be succinctly sum-
marized in the following 2x2 matrix:
Table 1. Optimal exchange rate regime
Goods market friction Asset market friction
Real shock Flexible Fixed
Monetary shock Fixed Flexible
The optimal exchange rate regime thus becomes an empirical issue that de-
pends both on the type of shock hitting a particular economy and on the
relative distortions present in goods and asset markets.
2It is worth noting that our results are in the spirit of an older literature that focused on
the pros and cons of alternative exchange rate regimes in models with no capital mobility
(see, for instance, Fischer (1977) and Lipschitz (1978)). See also Ching and Devereux
(2003) for a related analysis in the context of optimal currency areas.
3The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the main model ￿a
perfect-foresight version of Lahiri, Singh, and VØgh (2006a) ￿and solves it
for the cases of both ￿ exible and ￿xed exchange rates. Section 3 compares
the two regimes for ￿ uctuating output and velocity paths. Section 4 con-
tains some brief concluding remarks. Some technical issues are relegated to
appendices.
2 The model
Consider a discrete-time model of a small open economy perfectly integrated
with the rest of the world in goods markets. There are two types of agents:
traders (who have access to capital markets) and non-traders (who do not
have access to capital markets). The fraction of traders is ￿ while that of
non-traders is 1 ￿ ￿. There is no uncertainty in the model and agents are
blessed with perfect foresight. The law of one price holds for the only good;
hence, Pt = EtP ￿
t . Foreign in￿ ation is assumed to be zero and, for simplicity,
P ￿
t is taken to be unity. Hence, Pt = Et.
Both traders and non-traders are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.
For the case of traders, we follow Lucas￿(1982) timing and assume that asset
markets open ￿rst (say, in the morning) followed by goods markets (in the
afternoon). By assumption, of course, non-traders do not have access to asset
markets and hence only visit goods markets.3
There are two types of shocks: real and monetary. Both traders and
non-traders face identical shocks. Real shocks are captured by ￿ uctuations
in the endowment of the only good;y. Following Alvarez, Lucas and Weber
(2001), we capture monetary ￿or velocity ￿shocks by allowing both traders
and non-traders to access a fraction v of current period sales (vtPtyt) and
letting vt ￿ uctuate over time.
To ￿x ideas, it proves useful to keep in mind the following scenario regard-
ing the model￿ s timing conventions. Households consist of two individuals:
a shopper and a seller. As is standard, households do not consume their
own endowment. As goods markets are about to open in the afternoon, the
seller and the shopper part and, in the standard model, would not see each
other until the end of the day. In other words, the seller stays in the store
3Asset market segmentation could be endogenized by assuming that there is a ￿xed cost
of accessing asset markets. With idiosyncratic ￿ uctuations in endowment, the number of
agents that choose to gain access to asset markets would be endogenously determined.
4selling the endowment to other households￿shoppers and the shopper visits
other stores to purchase goods. In the standard model, then, the shopper
does not return to the store until after goods markets close and therefore
has no access to the money balances accrued to the seller from the sale of
the current-period endowment (Ptyt). In the current model, we depart from
the standard model by allowing the shopper to come back to the store once
during the goods market session, empty the cash register, and go back to
shopping. We assume that the amount of money in the cash register at the
time the shopper comes back to the store is vtPtyt, where 0 < v < 1.









t); i = T;NT: (1)
where ci denotes consumption of an agent of type i.
2.1 Non-traders
Non-traders do not have access to asset markets and, hence, hold only money.









t denotes end-of-period t ￿ 1 (and hence beginning of period t)
nominal money balances in the hands of non-traders. The initial level of
nominal money balances, MNT
0 , is given. Non-traders are subject to a cash-
in-advance constraint of the form:
M
NT
t + vtEtyt ￿ Etc
NT
t : (3)
The nominal money balances that non-traders can use to purchase goods
consist of the nominal money balances that they bring into period t, MNT
t ,
and a fraction vt of current-period sales (recall that, by assumption, 0 < vt <
1).
We will only consider equilibrium paths along which the cash-in-advance
binds.4 If the cash-in-advance constraint binds, then we can solve for cNT
t
from equation (3) to obtain:
4Appendix 5.1 derives su¢ cient conditions for the cash-in-advance constraint to bind.
Contrary to what our intuition would ￿rst tell us ￿that the cash-in-advance constraint







; t ￿ 0: (4)
To ￿nd out how much money balances non-traders will carry on to the
next period, substitute (4) into (2) to obtain:
M
NT
t+1 = (1 ￿ vt)Etyt: (5)
When the cash-in-advance binds, the non-traders￿problem becomes com-
pletely mechanical. In other words, their opportunity set consists of only one
point in every period ￿given by (4) ￿and there is thus no need to carry out
any maximization. Intuitively, non-traders begin their life with a given level
of nominal money balances, M0. They augment these cash balances with a
fraction v0 of period 0 sales, v0E0y0. Since the cash-in-advance binds, they
spend all of their money balances, MNT
0 +v0E0y0, on consumption in period
0. Their end-of-period cash balances consist of the cash proceeds from selling
their endowment, E0y0, minus the amount of period 0 sales spent in period
0, v0E0y0. They thus enter period 1 with M1(= (1￿v0)E0y0) and the process
begins anew.
2.2 Traders
Traders have access to asset markets and thus behave like consumers in any
standard model with perfect capital mobility. The only di⁄erence is that,
like non-traders, they have access to a fraction vt of current-period sales.
Let us ￿rst look at the ￿ ow constraint for the asset market. Traders
enter the asset market with a certain amount of nominal money balances,
MT
t , and a certain amount of bonds, bt. Once in the asset market, they
receive/pay interest on the bonds they carried into the asset markets, Etrbt,
receive transfers from the government, T, and buy/sell bonds in exchange for
money.5 Traders exit the asset market with a quantity ^ Mt of nominal money
periods ￿ the cash-in-advance may bind under very weak conditions because unspent
money balances have an opportunity cost that is positively related to the state of the
economy (i.e., the opportunity cost is higher in good times). In good times, therefore,
non-traders would like to save for consumption smoothing motives but dissave for ￿nancial
reasons.
5Given the open economy nature of the model, the private sector as whole must always
be able to exchange money for foreign bonds (and viceversa) in the asset market (even
under ￿ exible rates), and bonds for goods (and viceversa) in the goods market. One can
6balances and bt+1 of bonds. The ￿ ow constraint for the asset market is thus:








Traders are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint:
^ M
T
t + vtEtyt ￿ Etc
T
t . (7)
What will traders￿nominal money balances be at the end of period t? Traders
will have the money brought from the asset market plus the proceeds from the




t+1 = ^ M
T
t + Etyt ￿ Etc
T
t . (8)
By substituting (8) into (6), we obtain the traders￿￿ ow constraint for period












For the purposes of the maximization ￿and by substituting (6) into (7) ￿we
can rewrite the cash-in-advance constraint as:
M
T
t + Et(1 + r)bt +
Tt
￿
￿ Etbt+1 + vtEtyt ￿ Etc
T
t . (10)
Traders thus maximize lifetime utility subject to the ￿ ow budget con-
straint (9) and the cash-in-advance constraint (10), for given values of MT
0
and b0. The Lagrangian is then given by:
imagine a trading agency that is in charge of such activities or, alternatively, that the
household has a third member, a foreign trader, whose job is to put aside some of the


















t + Et(1 + r)bt +
Tt
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+ Etyt ￿ Etc
T












t + Et(1 + r)bt +
Tt
￿





The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to cT, MT
t+1, and bt+1 are given,




t ) = Et(￿t + ￿t); (11)
￿t = ￿(￿t+1 + ￿t+1); (12)
Et+1(￿t+1 + ￿t+1) = Et(￿t + ￿t): (13)
The ￿rst-order condition with respect to ￿t naturally recovers the ￿ ow
constraint (9). Finally, the Kuhn-Tucker condition for ￿t recovers (10) and




t + Et(1 + r)bt +
Tt
￿
￿ Etbt+1 ￿ Etct
￿
￿t = 0. (14)








As in standard cash-in-advance models with Lucas￿(1982) timing, traders
will fully smooth consumption over time.










Perfect capital mobility (for traders) implies that the interest parity condition
holds:




8which enables us to rewrite condition (15) as
￿tit = ￿t: (17)
Since, at an optimum, ￿t > 0, equation (17) says that if it > 0, then ￿t > 0
which implies, from the complementary slackness condition (14) that the
cash-in-advance constraint binds. Since we will only consider equilibria in
which the nominal interest rate is positive, the cash-in-advance constraint
will always bind and traders￿end of period money balances can be obtained
by combining (7) and (8):6
M
T
t+1 = (1 ￿ vt)Etyt: (18)
2.3 Government
The government￿ s ￿ ow constraint is given by
Etht+1 = (1 + r)Etht + Mt+1 ￿ Mt ￿ Tt; (19)
where ht denotes net foreign bonds held by the government.
2.4 Equilibrium conditions
Money market equilibrium implies that:
Mt = ￿M
T
t + (1 ￿ ￿)M
NT
t : (20)
Equations (5) and (18) imply that MNT
t+1 = MT
t+1. Together with the






Since there are no di⁄erences across agents in terms of the endowment, all
agents hold the same amount of money (on a per-capita basis). Hence, (5)
and (18) together with the money market equilibrium condition (20) yield a
quantity theory equation:
Mt+1 = (1 ￿ vt)Etyt; t ￿ 0: (21)
6Appendix 5.1 derives the restrictions needed to ensure a positive nominal interest rate.
9To make it directly comparable to the quantity theory equation found in
textbooks (typically written as MV = Py, where V denotes velocity), we
can rewrite this last equation as
Mt+1
1 ￿ vt
= Etyt; t ￿ 0:
Velocity is thus given by 1=(1 ￿ vt). Hence, a higher v captures an increase
in the velocity of circulation, which rationalizes our terminology of ￿velocity
shocks￿when referring to changes in v.
To obtain the economy￿ s ￿ ow constraint, multiply the non-traders￿￿ ow
constraint (equation (2)) by 1￿￿ and the traders￿￿ ow constraint (equation
(9)) by ￿ and then add them up, taking into account the government￿ s ￿ ow
constraint (19)) and the money market equilibrium condition (20):
kt+1 ￿ kt = rkt + yt ￿ [￿c
T
t + (1 ￿ ￿)c
NT
t ]; (22)
where k ￿ ht + ￿bt denotes the economy￿ s per-capita net foreign assets.
Iterating forward and imposing the transversality condition limt!1
kt+1
(1+r)t =
0, we obtain the resource constraint:










t + (1 ￿ ￿)c
NT
t ]: (23)
In what follows, we will assume that k0 = 0.7
2.5 Equilibrium consumption
We will now derive expressions for consumption of both traders and non-
traders. To obtain non-traders￿consumption, substitute the quantity theory







E0 + v0y0; t = 0
(1￿vt￿1)Et￿1yt￿1+vtEtyt
Et ; t ￿ 1.
(24)
This expression will prove useful when dealing with ￿xed exchange rates.
When dealing with ￿ exible exchange rates, however, it will prove convenient
7This assumption just ensures that the present discounted value of income is identical
across traders and non-traders when the money supply or the exchange rate is ￿xed.
10to use (21) to rewrite (24) as
c
NT
t = yt ￿
Mt+1￿Mt
Et ; t ￿ 0. (25)
To obtain traders￿consumption, substitute (24) into (23) and solve for














































Equations (25) and (27) make clear the redistributive role that monetary
policy plays in this model. If, say, money supply is constant, then non-traders
consume their endowment (cNT
t = yt) and traders their permanent income
(cT = yp). An increase in the money supply (i.e., Mt+1 > Mt) implies a
transfer from non-traders to traders. The reverse is true in the case of a
reduction in the money supply.
2.6 Flexible exchange rates
Consider a ￿ exible exchange rate regime in which the monetary authority
sets a constant path of the nominal money supply:8
Mt = ￿ M; t ￿ 0: (28)
8We will consider only the extreme cases of a constant money supply (under ￿ exible
rates) and a ￿xed exchange rate (as opposed to time-varying paths of the exchange rate).
For an extension of our main results to more general rules involving a ￿xed rate of growth
of either the money supply or the exchange rate, see Lahiri, Singh, and VØgh (2006b).
11Substituting (28) into (25), we obtain non-traders￿consumption:
c
NT
t = yt; t ￿ 0: (29)
Two observations are worth making. First, consumption of non-traders will
￿ uctuate one-to-one with ￿ uctuations in the endowment. Flexible exchange
rates provide no insulation whatsoever for non-traders from output ￿ uctua-
tions. Second, consumption of non-traders is not a⁄ected by velocity shocks.
Substituting (28) into (27), we obtain traders￿consumption:
cT = y
p: (30)
Let us now derive the path of the nominal exchange rate. From the














When output increases (i.e., yt+1 > yt) ￿and for constant velocity ￿the
nominal exchange rate will fall (i.e., the domestic currency appreciates). In-
tuitively, higher output increases real money demand and hence leads to a
fall in the price level (i.e., in the nominal exchange rate). On the other hand,
when there is an increase in velocity (i.e., vt+1 > vt) ￿and for constant out-
put ￿the nominal exchange rate will increase (i.e., the domestic currency
depreciates). Intuitively, an increase in velocity implies that more money is
available to purchase the same level of output, which will lead to a higher
price level (i.e., a higher nominal exchange rate).
Finally, the path of the nominal interest rate follows from combining the
interest parity condition (16) with (32):






122.7 Fixed exchange rates
Consider now a ￿xed exchange rate regime in which the monetary authority
sets a constant value of the nominal exchange rate:
Et = ￿ E.
To ensure that initial conditions under ￿xed rates are consistent with those
under ￿ exible rates (in the sense that they generate the same initial level of
real money balances as in the case of ￿ exible exchange rates), we take initial
nominal money holdings to be MN
0 = MT
0 = M0 = ￿ M. Further, we assume
that the exchange rate is ￿xed at the level given by ￿ E = ￿ M=(1 ￿ v0)y0.
Under these assumptions, initial real money balances, M0= ￿ E are given by
(1 ￿ v0)y0, as is the case under ￿ exible rates (recall (31)).







￿ E + v0y0; t = 0;
(1 ￿ vt￿1)yt￿1 + vtyt; t ￿ 1:
(34)
Since M0= ￿ E = (1 ￿ v0)y0, it follows that cNT
0 = y0.















t [(1 ￿ vt￿1)yt￿1 + vtyt]
!)
: (35)
Let us now derive the path of the nominal money supply, which is endogenous
under ￿xed exchange rates. M0 = ￿ M, as remarked earlier. The path of Mt,
for t ￿ 1 then follows from the quantity theory equation (21):
Mt+1 = (1 ￿ vt) ￿ Eyt; t ￿ 0:
3 Comparing ￿ exible versus ￿xed exchange
rates
We are now ready to ask our main question: which exchange regime is better?
133.1 Velocity shocks only
Suppose that there are only velocity shocks (i.e., set yt = yp). Then, under
￿ exible rates, consumption of non-traders is completely ￿ at and equal to yp
(as follows from equation (29)). Further, as equation (30) indicates, traders￿
consumption is also equal to permanent income. Clearly, this equilibrium
corresponds to the ￿rst-best. Both traders and non-traders perfectly smooth
consumption over time.
Under ￿xed rates, it follows from equation (34) that consumption of non-





yp; t = 0;
yp(1 + vt ￿ vt￿1); t ￿ 1: (36)













In what follows, it will prove useful to de￿ne a ￿permanent￿velocity shock,
vp, as
v









t(vt ￿ vt￿1) = 0: (38)
Substituting (38) into (37), we obtain traders￿consumption:
cT = y
p:
Traders￿consumption is therefore the same under ￿ exible and ￿xed exchange
rates and they are thus indi⁄erent between the two regimes. As for non-
traders, it follows from (36) and (38) that the present discounted value of
non-traders￿ consumption under ￿xed rates is the same as under ￿ exible
9In a stochastic version of the model, the equivalent assumption would be that velocity
shocks are white noise.
14exchange rates. As a result, non-traders are clearly better o⁄ under ￿ exible
exchange rates in which case they have a ￿ at path of consumption. Since
traders are indi⁄erent, we conclude that ￿ exible exchange rates dominate.
What is the underlying intuition? The key lies in the role of the exchange
rate as a shock absorber in the presence of velocity shocks. If velocity in-
creases, the nominal exchange rate also increases (a nominal depreciation
of the domestic currency) thus o⁄setting the shock. Under ￿xed exchange
rates, the natural adjustment mechanism (i.e., the agents￿ability to recom-
pose their nominal money balances through the central bank) is not fully
operative because non-traders cannot access asset markets. Hence, ￿ uctua-
tions in velocity lead to ￿ uctuations in consumption. Speci￿cally, an increase
in velocity (i.e., vt > vt￿1) implies that more money balances are available for
consumption; a decrease in velocity (i.e., vt < vt￿1) implies that less money
balances are available for consumption.
3.2 Output shocks only
Suppose that there are only output shocks (i.e., set vt = ￿ v > 0). Then under
￿ exible rates, consumption of non-traders and traders continues to be given
by (29) and (30). Non-traders absorb the full variability of the endowment
path.





y0; t = 0;
yt + (1 ￿ ￿ v)(yt￿1 ￿ yt); t ￿ 1: (39)




t(yt￿1 ￿ yt) = 0. (40)
From (39) and (40), it follows that the present discounted value of cNT
t under
￿xed rates will be the same as under ￿ exible rates.
Consumption of traders follows from (35) and (40):
cT = y
p. (41)
As is the case under velocity shocks, traders￿consumption is the same under
￿ exible and ￿xed exchange rates. Traders are therefore indi⁄erent between
the two regimes.






y0; t = 0;
￿ vyt + (1 ￿ ￿ v)yt￿1; t ￿ 1; (42)
which makes clear that from t = 1 onwards, non-traders￿consumption is
an average of this period￿ s and last period￿ s output. Clearly, consumption
of non-traders will ￿ uctuate under both ￿ exible and ￿xed exchange rates
but will ￿ uctuate less under ￿xed rates. Since, as shown above, the present
discounted value of cNT
t is the same under both regimes, non-traders￿welfare
will be higher under ￿xed exchange rates.
Intuitively, (42) states that today￿ s consumption is a weighted average of
last period￿ s and this period￿ s real sales revenues. Fixed exchange rates allow
purchasing power to be transferred across periods which, as equation (42)
makes clear, results in some consumption smoothing over time. In contrast,
under ￿ exible rates, a constant money supply implies that the real value of
last period￿ s sales is equal to current output. As a result, current consumption
depends solely on current output.
We conclude that since traders are indi⁄erent between the two regimes
and non-traders are better o⁄ under a ￿xed exchange rate, social welfare
will be maximized if, in response to output shocks, a ￿xed exchange rate is
adopted.
4 Concluding remarks
One of the most in￿ uential results in open economy macroeconomics ￿which
follows from any standard Mundell-Fleming model ￿holds that the choice of
the optimal exchange rate regime should depend on the type of shock hitting
the economy. If shocks are predominantly real, a ￿ exible exchange rate is
optimal, whereas if shocks are predominantly monetary, a ￿xed exchange
rate is optimal.
We have shown that this in￿ uential result critically depends on the as-
sumption that while there are frictions in goods markets (i.e., sticky prices),
asset markets are frictionless. If we reverse these assumptions ￿frictionless
goods markets and segmented asset markets ￿we turn the famous Mundell-
Fleming dictum on its head: ￿ exible rates are called for in the presence of
monetary shocks whereas ￿xed exchange rates are optimal in the presence
16of real shocks. We thus conclude that the optimal exchange rate depends
not only on the type of shock (monetary versus real) but also on the type of
friction (goods market versus asset market).
A more modern approach to exchange rate regimes would view ￿xed and
￿ exible exchange rate regimes as two particular cases of a more general mon-
etary policy rule, which could in turn incorporate a response to current (if
observable) and past shocks. In Lahiri, Singh, and VØgh (2006b), we follow
this more general approach and show how an optimal monetary policy rule
would actually involve responding to contemporaneous shocks. It is only in
the absence of output shocks (i.e., a world with only velocity shocks) that a
￿pure￿￿ exible exchange rate ￿as studied in this paper ￿would be optimal.
5 Appendices
5.1 Conditions for a binding cash-in-advance
This appendix derives the conditions needed for the cash-in-advance to bind
for both non-traders and traders and then provides an example of the re-
strictions that need to be imposed on the output and velocity processes.




t=0 to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to
the sequence of ￿ ow constraints given by (2) and the sequence of cash-in-






























t + vtEtyt ￿ Etc
N￿
:






t ) = Et(￿t + ￿t); (43)
￿(￿t+1 + ￿t+1) = ￿t: (44)
17The Kuhn-Tucker condition for ￿t is given by:
M
N
t + vtEtyt ￿ Etc




t + vtEtyt ￿ Etc
N￿
￿t = 0.
Suppose that ￿t > 0; that is, the cash-in-advance constraint binds. Then,
























If the cash-in-advance binds, it means that non-traders prefers not to carry
over nominal money balances from one period to the next even though doing
so would provide more consumption tomorrow. In other words, money bal-
ances are not used for saving purposes. In this case ￿and as condition (45)
indicates ￿the consumer is unwilling to save and therefore today￿ s marginal
utility will be higher than tomorrow￿ s adjusted by the discount factor and
the return on money.





























Flexible exchange rates Consider the case of ￿ exible exchange rates
with a constant money supply. In this case, cNT
t = yt and ￿t+1 = 0. Equation





18As long as this condition holds (which implies a restriction on the variability
of the velocity shocks), the cash-in-advance constraint will bind. Clearly,
since this conditions involves exogenous variables, one can always choose
parameters such that it will hold.
Fixed exchange rates Consider the case of ￿xed exchange rates. In
this case, Et+1 = Et = ￿ E. In this case, use condition (46), taking into
account (34), to obtain:
￿ <
(1 ￿ vt)yt + vt+1yt+1
(1 ￿ vt￿1)yt￿1 + vtyt
: (49)
Again, since this condition involves only exogenous variables, one can always
choose ￿ and output and velocity processes such that it holds.
Intuition To understand the intuition as to why the cash-in-advance
may bind for non-traders, consider the case of ￿ exible exchange rates and
no velocity shocks (i.e., output shocks only). In that case, condition (48)
will always hold because, by assumption, ￿ < 1. Intuitively, suppose that
yt > yt+1 and consider the non-trader￿ s choice at time t. Based on the
consumption smoothing motive, non-traders would want to save in order to
consume more next period when output will be low. However, given that
￿t = 0, periods of high output will coincide with periods in which the real
return on nominal money balances is low. To see this, notice that using the







Since yt > yt+1, then Et=Et+1 < 1 which means a negative real return on
money. Hence, with logarithmic preferences, the non-trader￿ s desire to dis-
save based on the negative real return on money more than o⁄sets the desire
to save based on consumption smoothing motives.
5.1.2 When does the cash-in-advance bind for traders?
For the CIA to bind for traders, we just need to ensure that the nominal
interest rate is positive. The restrictions needed for this depend on the
exchange rate regime.
19Flexible exchange rates From the interest parity condition (16), a
























then the nominal interest rate will always be positive and the CIA will always
bind for traders as well.
Fixed exchange rates Under ￿xed exchange rates, the interest parity
condition (16) indicates that the nominal interest rate will always be positive
since 1 + i = 1 + r.
5.1.3 An example
Let us illustrate the restrictions necessary to ensure a binding cash-in-advance
constraint for the cases of only one shock at a time (the case studied in the
text). Suppose ￿ = 0:96.
Output shocks only Suppose that vt = ￿ v = 0:2 > 0 and that yt alternates
between 1:04 and 1. For non-traders, (48) holds since ￿ < 1 and condition
(49) becomes (assuming the most restrictive case which is yt￿1 = 1:04, yt = 1,
and yt+1 = 1:04):
￿ <
(1 ￿ ￿ v)yt + ￿ vyt+1
(1 ￿ ￿ v)yt￿1 + ￿ vyt
;
which reduces to ￿ < 0:977 and hence holds. For traders, (50) is satis￿ed
since ￿ < yt=yt+1 = 0:962 and hence the CIA binds under both ￿ exible and
￿xed exchange rates.
20Velocity shocks Suppose that yt = yt+1 = yp. The velocity variable
alternates between two values: 0:20 and 0:22. Assume ￿rst that vt￿1 = 0:2,
vt = 0:22, and vt+1 = 0:2: Then, for non-traders under ￿ exible rates, it must





which holds since ￿ < 0:975: Under ￿xed rates, it must the case that
￿ <
1 ￿ vt + vt+1
1 ￿ vt￿1 + vt
; (52)
which holds - since under the most restrictive case in which vt￿1 = 0:2,
vt = 0:22, and vt+1 = 0:2, then ￿ < 0:961.




























t(vt ￿ vt￿1) = ￿(v
p ￿ v0) = 0:




t(yt￿1 ￿ yt) = 0 if y0 = yp
Replace v by y in Section 5.2 above.
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